信息不对称与公司理财策略  

Information Asymmetry and Financing Strategy of Enterprises

作　　者：刘耘彤[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《当代经济管理》2007年第3期127-128,共2页Contemporary Economic Management

摘　　要：目前我国的资本市场尤其是证券市场上存在的上市公司的管理层和投资者之间的信息不对称,造成了市场不能准确估计企业价值等逆向选择的问题,阻碍了企业价值最大化理财目标的最终实现。公司理财中不可忽视的一个问题,就是要将自身体质信息最好地传递给投资者。本文提出了在现有证券市场条件下,企业充分利用理财策略的信号作用,克服信息不对称带给自己不利影响的建议。At present, in China＇s capital market, especially stock market, information asymmetry between managers and investors in listed companies results in adverse selection, such as inaccurate evaluation on enterprise values by market, which blocks realization of maximal financing of enterprise＇s values. It is not neglectable in the corporate finance to transmit its information properly to invertors. This paper puts forward some suggestions that under present condition of stock market, the enterprise should make full use of signal functions of financing strategy to overcome the negative influences of information asymmetry.

关 键 词：信息不对称 融资 信号传递 

分 类 号：F23[经济管理—会计学]