民营金字塔结构下控制性少数股东隧道效应研究——来自我国上市公司的经验证据  

The Tunneling Effects of Controlling Minority Shareholder under Private Pyramid Structure-Empirical Evidences from China

作　　者：韩志丽[1] 杨淑娥[2] 史浩江[3] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,西安710049 [2]上海对外贸易学院,上海201600 [3]广东商学院,广州510320

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2007年第6期1-6,35,共7页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70672054)

摘　　要：在对控制性少数股东做出清晰界定的基础上,运用我国民营上市公司的非平衡面板数据,考察了民营金字塔结构下控制性少数股东剥夺外部股东的隧道效应.结果表明:在保证控制权的情况下,控制性少数股东所持有的现金流权越小,其隧道挖掘越严重;处于金字塔底层的公司资产利润率越低,控制性少数股东越倾向于对其进行隧道挖掘;投资者保护越差,越有利于控制性少数股东的隧道挖掘.相反,在投资者保护较好的企业,即使控股股东的现金流权较小,即使其资产收益率较低,也不会发生严重的掏空行为.Based on the clearly defining of controlling minority shareholder, this paper analyzes the tunneling effects of controlling minority shareholder under private pyramid structure using the unbalanced panel data of Chinese private listed finns. The results indicate that the smaller the cash-flow right owned by controlling minority shareholder or the lower the ROA of the under layer finn or the worse the protection of investors, the more severely the tunneling to outside shareholder. Even if the smaller cash flow right or the lower ROA, the controlling minority shareholder will not made severely tunneling when the finn is in better investors legal protection environment.

关 键 词：金字塔结构 控制性少数股东 隧道效应 代理问题 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]