自主创新、政府采购与招投标机制设计  

Independent Innovation,Government Prowrement and Public Auction Design

作　　者：马理[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《中国软科学》2007年第6期120-124,共5页China Soft Science

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金项目(2005038217);武汉市软科学研究计划项目(20054005062-28-02)

摘　　要：在政府采购的过程中,促进自主创新与公开招投标的实施目标具有一定的冲突,因此,研究如何建立促进自主创新的政府采购的招投标机制具有较强的理论与现实意义。本文对招投标理论进行了综述;从深刻认识增强自主创新能力的重大意义、确定自主创新的衡量标准、分层次招标、给予自主创新企业一定的优先待遇等方面,对政府采购的招投标机制进行设计,同时分析了政府采购招投标过程中可能出现的合谋操纵行为,并提出防范的相关建议。There are conflicts between independent innovation and public bidding of the government purchase,so it is important to study how to set up a public bidding institution to favor independent innovation.This paper summarized the price discovery and the collusion with the auction theory,and designed the public bidding institution from the importance of improving the independent innovation,confirming the standard of independent innovation,different levels bidding, giving innovative enterprises more priority treatment,and analyzed collusions in the bidding of the government purchase, and gave the methods to control it.

关 键 词：自主创新 政府采购 招投标 

分 类 号：D523[政治法律—政治学]