基于非对称信息博弈下的经理人股票期权探析  

On Executive Stock Option by Games with Asymmetrical Information

作　　者：刘海云[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南大学,河南开封475001

出　　处：《平顶山学院学报》2007年第2期24-26,共3页Journal of Pingdingshan University

摘　　要：经理人股票期权,作为对经理人实行的一种长期激励机制,是一种管理制度上的创新,从非对称信息博弈理论来分析经理人股票期权的产生及存在的意义,有助于深入理解经理人股票期权的理论背景及作用.Executive Stock Option, as a kind of long- term incentive mechanism to general managers is an innovation of control system. This article analyzes the generation and existing meaning of Executive Stock Option from games with asymmetrical information. It helps to understand thoroughly the theory background and function of Executive Stock Option.

关 键 词：经理人 股票期权 契约 非对称信息博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]