行政性资金配置、利率软约束与不良资产成因  

Administrative Capital Allocation■Soft Interest Rate Constraint and the Causation of Non-performing Loans

作　　者：宋芳秀[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学经济学院,北京100871

出　　处：《经济管理》2007年第13期9-12,共4页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

摘　　要：在我国经济转型时期,政府的行政性资金配置降低了企业实际支付的利率水平,削弱了利率在资源配置中的基础性作用,形成了"利率软约束"。本文通过动态博弈模型对"利率软约束"的经济影响进行了研究,认为利率软约束下银行贷款选择行为、企业还款行为、银行贷款回收行为的扭曲是造成我国不良资产问题的重要原因。During China＇s economic transition the financial subsidies of the government reduce the real interest rate level paid by the state-owned enterprises, impair the role of the interest rate in capital allocation and induce a ＂soft interest rate constraint＂ phenomenon. Soft interest rate constraint to some extent distorts the behavior of the enterprises and solicits many disadvantageous aftereffects. By building a dynamic game theory model, the author concludes that the distortion of banks and enterprises＇ behavior is the main causation of the nonperforming loans in our banking system.

关 键 词：行政性资金配置 利率软约束 不良资产 

分 类 号：F830.2[经济管理—金融学]