股权结构、报酬激励与公司绩效的相关性  

The Correlation Between Incentive Remuneration and Corporate Performance in Different Shareholding Structures

作　　者：岳军[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济系,天津300071

出　　处：《财经论丛》2007年第4期89-96,共8页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

摘　　要：对电子信息业上市公司的实证研究表明,我国大多数企业间高管人员的现金报酬与经营业绩具有正相关性。但受股权结构影响,二者关系尚须进一步理顺。为此,需提高高管人员和控股股东的持股比重,加强对流通股占优企业管理者的监督与激励,适度拉大国有控股企业间高管报酬的差距,增加低报酬非国有控股企业高管人员的报酬,逐步形成企业间高管报酬增长与约束的良性机制。The positive research on the listed companies in electronic and information industry shows that most of the deluxe managers＇ salary has positive correlation with their business performance in our country. Being influenced by the shareholding structure, the relationship mentioned above should still be adjusted. For the reason, we should increase the proprietary proportion of the deluxe managers and the holding shareholders, strengthen the supervision and the inspiration for the managers in the negotiable stock companies, extend the margin of the deluxe managers＇ salary in the state holding companies appropriately, increase the deluxe managers＇ low salary in the non - state holding companies, and build a positive mechanism on the growth and control of the deluxe managers＇ salary in eompanies gradually.

关 键 词：上市公司 高管报酬 激励 经营业绩 

分 类 号：F121.26[经济管理—世界经济]