激励设计中棘轮效应的分析  

Analysis of the Ratchet Effect in Incentive Design

作　　者：张传明[1] 王杨[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学土木建筑学院,山东青岛266510

出　　处：《山东科技大学学报（自然科学版）》2007年第2期99-102,共4页Journal of Shandong University of Science and Technology(Natural Science)

摘　　要：棘轮效应是委托代理关系中委托人与代理人追求目标发生冲突时产生的一种现象。借用单阶段静态分析和双阶段动态分析,认为产生这种现象的根源在于两者的信息不对称,委托人难于观察代理人的努力程度,企业经营的不确定因素多而复杂,委托人和代理人无法达成长期一致的激励合同,得出棘轮效应的大小由企业风险和代理人风险规避程度来决定的结论。The ratchet effect is a phenomenon induced in conflict between entruster and agent who pursue different objectives in the entrustment-agency relation. The authors believe that the reasons for the phenomenon lie in the asymmetry information by means of single-stage static and two-stage dynamic analyses. The entruster cannot know how hard the agents work and the factors affected the enterprise operations are complicated and uncertain; entruster and agent can＇t make a long coincident incentive contract. The conclusion is that the magnitude of ratchet effect is decided by the degree of evading the risks of firms and agents.

关 键 词：棘轮效应 委托代理关系 两阶段博弈分析 

分 类 号：F08[经济管理—政治经济学]