上市公司会计信息披露管制的博弈分析  

Gaming Analysis on Accounting Information Disclosure Controlling of Listed Companies

作　　者：宋在科[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学,蚌埠233041

出　　处：《电子科技大学学报（社科版）》2007年第3期18-21,共4页Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition)

摘　　要：会计信息的边际生产成本很低,排除费用很高,且其对抗性弱、排它性弱,使得上市公司的会计信息披露后,不仅现有的投资人受益,潜在投资者及政府也能因此受益,从而有利于整个证券市场的资源配置。但是,会计信息的外部性使会计信息生产的成本没有完全得到补偿,会计信息生产者缺乏激励,单纯依靠市场的力量刺激会计信息生产则会出现会计信息供给不足。上市公司披露的会计信息是否真实、完整,成为管制方的主要问题。本文阐述了博弈论在会计信息披露管制研究中的优势,并运用博弈论对会计信息披露方和管制方的成本效益关系进行了动态分析。The characteristics of low marginal cost, high exclusion expense, weak antagonistic and exclusive of ac-counting information make both existing ＆ potential investors and governments benefit from accounting information disclos-ing of listed companies, and help allocating resources in stock market consequently. However, supply of accounting infor-mation is insufficient in market because of externality. The most important issue for controller is whether the information from listed companies is true and integrated. In this paper, the advantage of theory of game in accounting information dis-closure research is expatiated, and dynamic analysis is applied for cost-benefit relationship of disclosure ＆ controller under the theory of game.

关 键 词：会计信息披露 管制 博弈 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]