中国移动通信运营商的进入遏制研究  

Analysis of Entry and Deterred Entry of China Duopoly Mobile Operators

作　　者：沈阿强[1] 王琦[1] 吕廷杰[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京邮电大学继续教育学院,北京100876 [2]北京邮电大学经济管理学院,北京100876

出　　处：《电信科学》2007年第6期79-82,共4页Telecommunications Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(No.70472073)

摘　　要：基于中国即将开始全面部署第三代移动通信,可能有更多的潜在进入者进入目前双寡头垄断的移动运营市场。本文构建了两个在位者和一个新进入者进入的博弈模型。研究表明,在位者会通过增加资本水平的投入,从而成功遏制新进入者,而在通过牌照发放的准入制度安排下,进入又不可避免。针对这种困境,给出了详细分析和监管建议。With the development of China deploying the third generation mobile telecommunication, more latent entrant will entry into China mobile market which is now composed with duopoly mobile operations, China Mobile and China Unicorn. The paper develops a game model based on two authorities and one entrant. It finds that the authorities will add investment capital and then deter the latent entrant successfully. But with the rule of license, the authorities cannot avoid the entrance, for this dilemma, this paper gives in-depth analysis and regulation suggestions.

关 键 词：双寡头垄断 移动运营商 进入 遏制 

分 类 号：TN929.533[电子电信—通信与信息系统]