自愿连锁组织的经济性分析  

Analysis of the Economics of Voluntary Chain Organization

作　　者：高政利[1] 欧阳文和[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南商学院工商管理系,湖南长沙410205

出　　处：《广东商学院学报》2007年第3期16-19,共4页Journal of Guangdong University of Business Studies

基　　金：湖南省自然科学基金项目(06ZC42);湖南省社会科学基金项目(05JD29)

摘　　要：从生产商的经济生产批量、零售商的经济订货批量以及生产商的数量—价格折扣模型的策略角度出发,针对自愿连锁组织集体物品收益,结合上海家联组建的自愿连锁运行现实,运用曼瑟尔.奥尔森、科斯等有关组织的研究结论,提出:由于存在物流配送信息系统的控制权问题以及控制权分散化所带来的效率损失,自愿连锁组织的集体物品收益在商品价格、数量等因素存在动态性变化下,团队生产的超额效率将被增加的监督成本所耗散掉,因此,自愿连锁组织集体物品不可能被提供到最优程度。From a strategic angle of the economic of retailers and the quantity-price discount model, Holmstrom, and combining the Shanghai Jialian＇s production quantity of manufacturers, the economic order quantity by using the organization study results by Mancur Olson and Bengt voluntary chain practice, the author finally puts forward the control fight of logistic delivery information system and efficacy losses owing to control rights in the voluntary chain organizations. Under the dynamic game, the organization public action is from the initial win-win cooperative game to the medium non-cooperative game and finally to the Cournot oligarchy competition cooperative game. The repeated game will influence the dynamic changes, so the extra efficacy which was produced by the groups will be reduced by the increasing supervision cost. In point of this situation, the public goods in the voluntary chain organization will not be provided in the most favored breadth.

关 键 词：自愿连锁 集体物品 博弈 

分 类 号：F721.7[经济管理—产业经济]