多银行贷款池合约的风险分散和激励研究  

SME Lending: Based on the Multi-small-banks' Loans Pool

作　　者：张维[1,2] 高雅琴[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院 [2]天津财经大学,天津300222

出　　处：《管理评论》2007年第7期3-9,26,共8页Management Review

基　　金：国家教育部博士点基金(20060056013)

摘　　要：由于单笔贷款成本、经营风险以及由信息不对称而导致的认知风险均比较高,中小企业较难获得大银行的贷款;但一般认为,小银行在解决上述信息不对称方面及小规模贷款的成本方面较之于大银行更有优势。不过,由于这类银行总资产规模小、抗风险能力差,使得其对中小企业的贷款依然面临困难。本文试图通过构建多个小银行贷款池的方式,分散小银行由于资产规模小造成的非系统风险,同时也能避免资产出售造成的逆向选择问题。我们设计了多个银行贷款池风险分担合约,获得了封闭解,并进一步讨论了该合约的特征。结果表明,这种分担合约保留了小银行信息优势,同时有效地分散了风险,为中小企业贷款难的问题提供了一个解决方案。Small and medium enterprises(SME) can hardly get loans from big banks because of high cost per loan,high business risk and high risk labeled on them due to asymmetric information. As are generally known, however, small banks can do better than big banks in dealing with asymmetric information and the high cost of the small loan. But small banks, with its small total assets and poor risk resisting ability, still have difficulties in lending to SME. This paper tries to diversify the non-system risk of small banks through the multi-small-banks' loans pool to avoid the reverse-selection problem. We design a multi-bank risk sharing contract, obtain closed-form solutions and discuss the characteristics of the contract. Our conclusion is that the risk sharing contract can efficiently diversify the risk while remaining the information advantage of small banks, thus providing a resolution to the SME loans.

关 键 词：中小企业贷款 信息不对称 多银行贷款池 风险分担合约 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学]