建设项目业主-设计方行为分析  

Analysis of Owner-designer's Behavior in Chinese Construction Projects

作　　者：潘鹏程[1] 刘应宗[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院,天津300072

出　　处：《中国工程科学》2007年第7期57-60,共4页Strategic Study of CAE

摘　　要：在政府投资建设的项目中,业主决策往往受到个人偏好如审美观点、业绩倾向的影响,而设计方也受利益驱动,迎合业主的个人偏好,导致面子工程、政绩工程泛滥。文章利用委托代理模型,分析了设计方在诚信经营和迎合业主个人偏好条件下业主投资效益与设计方努力程度的变化。指出通过提高业主和设计方的政治风险成本,可以有效地减少业主个人偏好和设计方的投机行为的发生。In the construction projects invested by Chinese government, the owners are often affected by their personal preference such as taste standpoint or individual achievement when they are making decisions. At the same time, the designer caters to the owner＇s pleasure for the sake of benefit. As a result, there are too many ＂face projects＂, ＂achievement projects＇in China＇s cities. The principal-agent model is used in this article to analyze the change of owners＇ investment benefit and designers＇ effort under law-abiding and speculation conditions. It is concluded that the speculation activities can be efficiently reduced by strengthening supervision power and increasing the owners＇ and the designers＇ political risk cost.

关 键 词：建设项目 业主 设计方 行为 委托-代理 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]