从单层博弈到双层博弈:中国外交决策模式的变迁——以中国“复关”、“入世”谈判为例  

From One-Level Games to Two-Level Games:The Evolution of China’s Foreign Policy-Making Model

作　　者：钟龙彪[1] 王俊[2] 

机构地区：[1]外交学院 [2]浙江大学

出　　处：《世界经济与政治》2007年第7期62-68,共7页World Economics and Politics

摘　　要：双层博弈模式的特点在于从国际与国内政治互动的视角来解释国家的对外行为选择。应用双层博弈模式观察中国外交可以发现,自改革开放以后,中国的外交决策环境正在发生变迁,体现在三个方面:对外联系密切化、行为主体多元化及大众政治扩大化。外交决策模式因此发生转型,正在由单一的国际层次博弈转向国际、国内双层次博弈。在进行外交决策时,决策者不得不面临国际、国内双重压力,需要根据对国际、国内两个因素的综合考量后做出慎重选择。对中国“复关”、“入世”谈判进程的实证分析,进一步证实了这一判断。A two-level game model is applied to explain foreign policy-making in terms of the interactions between international and domestic politics. Using the two-level game model to observe China’s diplomacy, the authors discover that since the reform and opening-up, China’s foreign policy-making environment has changed in the direction of increased foreign exchanges, a pluralization of actors, and public politics. Thus, China’s foreign policy-making model has been transformed from an international-level game to an international and domestic game. In the process of decision-making, the decision makers have to face dual pressures from international and domestic politics and to make careful decisions under both pressures. An empirical analysis of China’s bargaining for accession to the GATT and WTO verifies this hypothesis.

关 键 词：双层博弈 中国外交 决策模式 

分 类 号：D821[政治法律—政治学]