工程投标中串标行为的信号博弈分析  

Analysis on the collusion tender in the construction bidding process based on signaling game

作　　者：任宏[1] 祝连波[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学,重庆400045

出　　处：《土木工程学报》2007年第7期99-103,110,共6页China Civil Engineering Journal

摘　　要：自我国从2000年开始执行《中华人民共和国招标投标法》以来,建筑市场的竞争逐步走向规范化、法制化、有序化的轨道。然而,近期在建筑市场竞争中不断涌现的串标、围标、合谋等违法行为,已严重干扰正常的市场竞争秩序。运用信号博弈理论,建立不完全信息动态博弈模型,通过求解模型,找出模型的混同均衡解和分离均衡解,得到影响串标者行为的因素为:招标人对串标者的处罚费及招标人检查串标的成本,而与投标人的串标成本无关。提出治理串标行为的经济和法律措施,如合理设置检查成本与处罚费的比例、加大处罚费及加强对报高价投标人的检查等措施,为我国建筑市场的管理者和监督者治理串标行为、净化建筑市场及创造和谐竞争环境提供有益参考。Since the enforcement of the Law competitions in the construction market have activities, such as collusion tenders, however, on Tendering and Bidding of People＇s Republic of China in 2000, the become more and more regulated, legalized and systematized. Illegal still come forth frequently, severely disturbing normal market order. An incomplete-information dynamic game model is formulated based on the signal game theory, and a pooling equilibrium solution and a separating equilibrium solution are obtained. The factors affecting collusion tender actions include the punishment cost and inspection cost to the bidders, unrelated with the collusion cost to the tenders. Proposals are provided to design an appropriate ratio between the inspection cost and the punishment cost, and to increase punitive cost to the collusion bidders and to check the high-cost bidders, for administering collusion tender actions. These measures may serve as a reference for forbidding collusion tender actions and clarify the construction market.

关 键 词：投标 串标 不完全信息 信号博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F284