产权约束、租金效应与资本市场制度博弈——对中国资本市场发展的一种解释  

Property Rights Restriction,Rent Effect and System Game in the Capital Market

作　　者：夏小东[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《西安交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2007年第4期24-27,共4页Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University：Social Sciences

摘　　要：自1999-2000年以来,中国资本市场的发展开始延伸到了以推动存量股份交易为主要内容的产权结构调整阶段,并且伴随着不同产权主体的利益冲突,市场均衡逐步经历了一个由均衡到失衡再到新均衡建立的变迁过程。立足于国家理论及其资本市场租金效应,以中国资本市场的二元产权结构及其产权约束为为切入点,对中国资本市场制度变迁予以了经济学解释,指出以实现产权激励相容为核心的市场化改革取向是资本市场最终打破初始制度的低效率均衡并实现新均衡的基本途径。Since the turn of the 20th century, the capital market in China has entered a period in which the main task is to promote existing equity trading. Meanwhile, with drastic conflicts of interests among different equity bodies, the equilibrium of the market has experienced a transitional process between equilibrium and disequilibrium. This paper gives an economic explanation for the institutional change of the capital market in China based on dualistic property rights structure and its property rights restriction. It is also pointed out that market-based reform via implementation of property rights compatibility is the fundamental approach to upset the inefficient disequilibrium of the initial system and to create a new equilibrium.

关 键 词：国家模型 二元产权结构 制度变迁 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]