非对称信息条件下供应链收入共享契约协调  

Coordinating Supply Chain with Revenue-Sharing Contract Under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：邱若臻[1] 黄小原[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2007年第8期1205-1208,共4页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572088);教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20050145022);辽宁省科学技术计划项目(2004401015)

摘　　要：研究了非对称信息条件下供应链收入共享契约协调问题,建立了新的收入共享契约协调模型.在模型中,主方供应商具有批发价格和收入共享比例决策权,从方零售商具有隐匿边际成本信息和订货量决策权.探讨了零售商边际成本信息隐匿情况下的供应商最优收入共享策略,并将其同对称信息情况进行对比分析.最后进行了数值仿真.研究表明,为了设计一个激励零售商的最优收入共享策略,供应商将对零售商私有成本信息的不可观测性付出代价,导致利润降低,而零售商却可以从中获益.The problem how to coordinate the supply chain with revenue-sharing contract under asymmetric information is studied, with a new model developed relevantly. In this model, the supplier as the leader has the decision-making right for wholesale price and revenue-sharing proportion, while the retailer as the follower has just the right to conceal the information on marginal cost and determine the ordering quantity. Discusses the supplier＇ s optimal revenuesharing strategy in case the retailer conceals the marginal cost, with a comparative analysis made under symmetrical information at the same time. A numerical simulation is done and the result shows that the supplier＇s optimal revenue-sharing strategy to spur retailer will pay a price for the unobservability of retailer＇s private information and reduce his/her profit, while the retailer can gain from that.

关 键 词：供应链 收入共享 契约 协调 非对称信息 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]