股票回购中内幕交易与股价操纵行为规制——由新《公司法》第一百四十三条引发的思考  

Normal Institution for Insider Dealing and Stock Price Manipulating Behavior in Stock Repurchasing Thoughts Article 143 of the New "Company Law"

作　　者：林敏[1] 干胜道[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学工商管理学院,四川成都610061

出　　处：《河南金融管理干部学院学报》2007年第4期91-94,共4页Journal of Henan College of Financial Management Cadres

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目"信息非对称状态下企业资金安全性控制研究"的阶段性成果(70202004)

摘　　要：新《公司法》增加了股票回购事由的条款,放宽了对股票回购的限制。但在股票回购的立法方面,总体上仍较为简单、粗略,缺乏具体的操作规则,没有形成完整、严密的规制体系。由于立法模式的差异,各国对股票回购过程中内幕交易及股价操纵行为的管制形式也有所不同。对欧美等国对股票回购过程中的内幕交易和股价操纵行为的监管进行比较分析,可以为我国股票回购实施过程中如何抑制股价操纵行为提供启示。The provision of the subject of stock repurchase is added in the new ＂ company law＂, releasing the restriction of stock repurchase. But the legislation of stock repurchase is still simple and rough, without specific operation rules, or a complete, rigorous normal institutional system. Owing to the difference of legislation models of various countries, the control forms of insider dealing and stock price manipulating behavior in stock repurchasing are rather different. A comparison analysis on the supervision of insider dealing and stock price manipulating behavior in stock repurchasing in Europe and the United States can give some enlightenment for China on how to curb stock price manipulating behavior in the course of proceeding with stock repurchasing.

关 键 词：证券市场 股票回购 公司法 内幕交易 股价操纵 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]