葛梯尔反例与实践确证的知识论  

Gettier's Counterexamples and the Knowledge Theory of Practical Justification

作　　者：闫景强[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100872

出　　处：《喀什师范学院学报》2007年第4期26-31,共6页Journal of Kashgar Teachers College

摘　　要：葛梯尔反例吹响了挑战知识的传统三元定义(JTB)的号角。现有的方案虽然提出了一些有意义的观点,但都未能完满解决葛梯尔问题。实践确证的知识论把"实践"纳入知识根据的范围,区分了主观根据与客观根据,厘清了信念与知识的根本区别,合理地回答了葛梯尔反例引发的一系列重大问题,为进一步研究认知逻辑打下了基础。Gettier＇s Counterexamples began to challenge the traditional tripartite definition of knowledge. Although, the present schemes of knowledge raised some meaningful issues respectively, they failed to solve the Gettier＇s problems perfectly. The knowledge theory of practical justification introduces a notion of ＂practice＂ into the domain of knowledge evidences, distinguishes subjective evidences and objective evidences, draws the essential distinctions between belief and knowledge, answers a important series of problems induced by Gettier＇s counterexamples, which would be a major contribution to further study of epistemic logic.

关 键 词：知识的三元定义 葛梯尔反例 钵中之脑 实践 实践确证理论 

分 类 号：B023[哲学宗教—哲学理论]