非对称信息下参与人不同风险偏好组合的委托代理问题  

Principal Agent Model under Players' Different Risk Attitude Combination with Asymmetric Information

作　　者：田厚平[1] 刘长贤[1] 吴萍[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京理工大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210094

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2007年第3期24-28,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70372010);南京理工大学校科研发展基金项目(XKF05061)

摘　　要：针对目前研究常采用的"委托人风险中性、代理人风险规避"这一风险偏好假设的局限性,将参与人的风险偏好拓展到"委托人风险中性、代理人风险规避或风险中性","委托人风险规避、代理人风险中性或风险规避"等共四种组合类型。研究了每种组合下的最优激励机制设计,给出了一个统一的委托代理模型,并对这四种组合下的最优激励合同进行了对比分析。得到在代理人风险态度一定的情况下,委托人越是风险规避,委托人所获收益越低;在委托人风险态度一定的情况下,代理人越是风险规避,委托人的收益越低等结论。同时为企业免费为员工提供一些培训课程、在招聘员工时对备选人员进行一些测试以判断其风险偏好态度等现象提供了解释。Aiming at the limitation of the often-used hypothesis that principal is risk neutral and agent is risk adverse, the expanded hypothesis is given here that the players＇ risk attitude has four states, firstly principal is risk neutral and agent is risk adverse, secondly they are both risk neutral, thirdly principal is risk adverse and agent is risk neutral, the last is they are both risk adverse. And the optimal incentive mechanism is studied under each state. The united principle-agent model is proposed, and the comparison among the four optimal mechanisms is given. The model results show that the principal＇s returns decrease with its risk adverse increasing or the agent＇s risk adverse increasing. And it gives explain that why some enterprises offer some training program to the agents free of charge and practicing their enterprising spirit, and sometimes the enterprise gives some tests to estimate the agents＇ risk attitude.

关 键 词：激励机制 最优合同 委托代理理论 风险偏好 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]