中国银行保险中的监管干预及其影响  

Regulatory Intervention in China's Bancassurance Channel and Its Impacts

作　　者：石晓军[1] 郭金龙[2] 郑海涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京航空航天大学经济管理学院,北京100083 [2]中国社会科学院金融研究所,北京100732

出　　处：《保险研究》2007年第8期51-53,35,共4页Insurance Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70502005);国家社会科学基金(07AJY009)

摘　　要：基于中国银行保险的特殊性和中国银行保险目前的发展状况,实施监管干预具有合理性和必要性。监管干预的实质是利用监管的力量形成保险公司的策略联盟,以集体的力量改善保险公司在银行保险博弈中的劣势地位,促进中国银行保险市场的公平与效率。监管干预可以改善保险公司的地位,促进公平秩序形成;促进银行保险的合作创新,提高效率;促进保险公司内部管理的进一步优化,提高竞争力。监管干预的主要风险有:监管机构自身松懈干预策略的力度;银保市场会出现暂时性回落的风险;小型的、特别是新的保险公司的经营可能会变得更加困难。为此,监管者要坚持不懈地强化干预策略的力度;对具体的干预措施不断评估和优化,以适应我国银行保险的发展趋势,兼顾中小保险公司的发展需要。Due to the uniqueness of the bancassurance business in China and the development situation of bancassurance business, it is rational and necessary to conduct regulatory intervention in this channel. The essence of regulatory intervention is to employ the regulatory forces to form a strategic alliance among insurance companies, overcoming the disadvantageous position of insurance companies in the bank and insurer game relationship and improving equality and efficiency in bancassurance market. Regulator＇s intervention can improve the position of insurance companies, promote the formation of an order of fair competition, enhance cooperation innovation and efficiency and urge insurance companies＇ optimization of internal management and enhance their competitiveness. However, the risks of regulatory intervention are that regulator＇s relaxation of intervention intensity, possible temporary fall-off of the bancassurance market and more difficulty of small, especially new insurer＇s operation. Therefore, the regulator should consistently intensify its intervention and continuously assess and optimize specific intervention measures to get adapted to the development trends of China＇s bancassurance business, and at the same time, giving proper consideration to the development needs of small and medium insurers.

关 键 词：银行保险 监管干预 行业自律公约 

分 类 号：F840.32[经济管理—保险]