基于成本信息缺失的VER政策与社会福利分析  

The Analysis of VER Policy and Optimal Social Welfare Based on Lack of Information for Production Cost

作　　者：钱春海[1] 韩燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国浦东干部学院现代产业与金融研究所,上海201204

出　　处：《财经研究》2007年第8期17-27,107,共12页Journal of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：文章在贸易主体间成本信息缺失的基础上,重新探讨了VER的政策含义。研究结果发现,在本国对外国厂商成本信息缺失的情境下,若产品市场为Cournot竞争,则VER将对两国产生实质的影响:对出口国而言,不论其厂商为何种类型,此时的VER政策都是非自愿的;本国的福利变化则需视出口厂商的类型而定。而在Bertrand竞争下,VER只在出口厂商为高成本类型时方对出口国有利,且不论外国厂商为何种类型,VER皆无法使两国同时获利。The policy implications of voluntary export restraints are examined under incomplete information. The results show that when firms engage in Cournot competition under incomplete information of foreign technologies, voluntary export restraints are involuntary for the exporting country, while domestic welfare will depend on the type of foreign firms. Under Bertrand competition, voluntary export restraints are voluntary for the exporting country when its firm is of a high cost type, however, they cannot increase the welfare of both countries.

关 键 词：自动出口限制 不完全信息 福利分析 

分 类 号：F415[经济管理—产业经济]