中国煤矿事故频发的博弈解释  

A Game of China's Frequent Coalmine Accidents

作　　者：肖兴志[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《财经问题研究》2007年第7期28-34,共7页Research On Financial and Economic Issues

基　　金：教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(06JJD630002)

摘　　要：煤矿事故的频发问题,已经成为我国构建和谐社会和实现经济社会可持续发展的瓶颈,也是公共政策部门以及相关学术界关注的重点问题之一。本文从博弈论的视角出发,基于中央政府、地方政府、煤矿企业、矿工四个博弈主体的利益考虑,通过中央政府与地方政府、地方政府与煤矿企业、煤矿企业与矿工之间三组博弈的分析解释,分析论述了我国煤矿事故产生的根本原因,并提出了完善煤矿安全治理、降低煤矿事故率的政策建议。Frequent coalmine accidents, which have become the bottleneck of China＇s construction of harmonious society and the realization of sustaining social and economic progress, receive wide attention from the public policy sector and the related academia. This paper investigates the interests of central government, local governments, coalmine enterprises and miners from the perspective of game theory. Based on the analysis of the three games between central government and local governments, between local governments and coalmine enterprises, and between coalmine enterprises and miners, it explains the basic causes of China＇s coalmine accidents and puts forward policy suggestion for the perfection of China＇s coalmine safety governance and the reduction of coalmine accident rate.

关 键 词：煤矿事故 安全规制 博弈 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]