控股股东的利益攫取与公司多元化折价  

The Expropriation of Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Diversification Discounts

作　　者：韩忠雪[1] 王益锋[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052 [2]西安电子科技大学经济管理学院,西安710071

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报》2007年第7期1053-1057,共5页Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

摘　　要：通过理论分析和实证研究发现,中国上市多元化公司存在折价现象,公司多元化程度与控股股东的超额控制程度和集团所属呈显著正相关关系,与控股股东的控制权、现金流权和两者的分离系数呈显著的负相关关系.表明控股股东的利益攫取行为可以有效解释公司多元化折价的产生.The theory analyses and empirical study found there are diversified corporate discounts on the listed firms in China, and the degree of diversification is increasing with excess control of controlling shareholders and group affiliated, and is decreasing with control right, free cash flow right and divergent rate of controlling shareholders. These results show that the expropriation of controlling shareholders can effectively explain corporate diversified discounts.

关 键 词：公司多元化折价 控股股东 超额控制 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]