圈钱行为与后果——募集资金滥用与再发行长期业绩恶化  

The Behavior and Consequence of Expropriation through SEO:Evidence from Abuse of Raised Fund and Underperformance

作　　者：朱云[1] 吴文锋[1] 吴冲锋[1] 芮萌[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052 [2]香港中文大学商学院

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报》2007年第7期1087-1091,共5页Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70202005)

摘　　要：对圈钱行为的认定和对圈钱后果的分析有利于证券市场发挥正常的融资和资源配置效率.上市公司再发行＂圈钱＂行为的一个重要表现就是募集资金的滥用.对1998～2001年沪深两市439个配股样本的研究发现,超过50%的公司存在募集资金滥用行为.对滥用和未滥用公司的长期业绩研究发现,募集资金滥用公司在再发行后的长期会计业绩和市场业绩出现恶化,未滥用公司的长期业绩并没有恶化.因此,募集资金滥用的＂圈钱＂行为是再发行后长期业绩恶化的主要原因.Abuse of raised fund is an important evidence of expropriation behavior of rights offering. Using 439 rights offering samples during the period from 1998 to 2001 in China stock market, this paper tested the relationship between the underperformance and the abuse behavior. The results show that more than one half samples conduct abuse behavior, and the performances of the firms conducting abuse behavior become worse after rights offering, while those of firms not conducting abuse behavior are normal. This indicates that the abuse behavior is the main reason that firms underperform after rights offering.

关 键 词：圈钱 再发行 募集资金滥用 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]