哈特/德沃金之争与法律实证主义的分裂——基于“分离命题”的考察  

The Hart/Dworkin Debate and the Separation of Legal Positivist

作　　者：朱振[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学理论法学研究中心,吉林长春130012

出　　处：《法制与社会发展》2007年第5期14-32,共19页Law and Social Development

基　　金：吉林大学哲学社会科学研究青年基金项目"法律体系理论研究"(2005QN020)

摘　　要：哈特与德沃金之争及其所开放出来的问题构成了当今英美法律哲学研究的理论坐标。哈特/德沃金之争的核心在于法律与道德有无必然的关联,哈特认为法律与道德不存在必然的关联;而德沃金认为,承认规则既无法识别原则也不是一个社会规则,法律与道德存在必然的关联。法实证主义在回应德沃金的批判时,在承认规则识别法律之判准的内容上发生了分歧,分裂为排他性与包容性的法实证主义。The Hart/Dworkin Debate and the problems resulting from the debate constitute the legal coordinate in the contemporary Anglo--American jurisprudence. The center of the debate consists in whether there is necessary connection between the law and morality. Hart thinks that there is no necessary connection between the law and morality. But Dworkin thinks that the rule of recognition neither identifies the principle, nor is a social rule and that there is necessary connection between the law and morality. When legal positivists response the critiques from Dworkin, they make differences about the content of the legality of the rule of recognition. Thus the legal positivism is divided into the exclusive and inclusive legal positivism.

关 键 词：分离命题 合法律性 排他性法律实证主义 包容性法律实证主义 

分 类 号：D90[政治法律—法学理论]