可信性、价值认证和投资银行声誉机制  

Creditability,Value Certification and Investment Bank's Reputation Mechanism

作　　者：刘江会[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海师范大学商学院,上海200234

出　　处：《财经研究》2007年第9期124-134,143,共12页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：上海市哲学社会科学基金项目(2005BJL008)

摘　　要：文章认为由于"机会主义"和"善意错误"的存在,致使投资银行在价值认证中面临"可信性"问题。文章利用C-F模型,探讨了投资银行声誉对解决"可信性"问题的意义,并通过分析投资银行声誉与发行企业质量、IPO抑价和承销费用之间的关系,发现投资银行声誉机制具有"信号显示"、"价值发现"和"补偿激励"等重要功能。由于没有很好地解决可信性问题,投资银行声誉机制的这些功能在我国基本不存在,因此我国投资银行很难发挥价值认证作用,这是我国证券发行市场有效性不足的一个重要原因。As an important value certification agency, investment bank always meets creditability problem due to its opportunism and honest mistakes. Employing the C-F model, this paper investigates the effects of reputation on investment bank＇s creditability. By analyzing the relationships between investment bank＇s reputation and quality of issuing firm, IPO underprice and underwriting fee, it finds that investment bank＇s reputation mechanism has some important functions, such as signaling, value discovering and compensation incentive. However, in China these functions never exist owing to not resolving creditability problem. China＇s investment bank can＇t play the role of value certification, which may be a key reason for the inefficiency of China＇s security issuing market.

关 键 词：可信性 价值认证 声誉 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]