全球银行业产权结构去国有化变革与外部性、软预算约束:基于新制度经济学产权理论的一个阐释性框架  

Denationalization Reform of the World Banking,Property Rights Structure,Externalities,and the Soft Budget Constraint——an Explanatory Framework Based upon the Property Rights Theory of New Institutional Economics

作　　者：刘万明[1] 李雪莲[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学经济学院

出　　处：《国际金融研究》2007年第9期11-19,共9页Studies of International Finance

摘　　要：最近20年来,全球银行业产权结构发生了重要的去国有化变革。可以从不同的视角来理解这一重要的全球性现象,本文主要依据新制度经济学的产权理论,从外部性和软预算约束的角度,论证银行业产权结构去国有化变革具有效率改进的重要涵义。这是因为在微观效率层次上,由于较轻的内部的外部性和软预算约束问题,非国有银行比国有银行拥有相对效率优势;在中观和宏观效率层次上,由于较轻的软预算约束和外部的外部性问题,非国有银行比国有银行对银行业、金融业和整个国民经济的负面影响更小。In the last twenty years or so, denationalization reform has taken place in world banking sector. Such an important global phenomenon can be interpreted from various perspectives. Mainly based on the Property rights theory of new institutional economics, and from the veiwpoint of the externalities and soft budget constraint, this paper demonstrates that the denationalization reform can bring about efficiency improvement , because of the lesser soft budget constraint and externality inside themselves, at the micro efficiency level, non-government banks possess relative efficiency advantages over state-owned banks; At the intermediate and macro efficiency levels, because of the lesser soft budget constraint and externalities outside themselves, non-government banks exert lesser negative efficiency impact upon the banking, financial industry and the whole national economy than stated-owned banks do.

关 键 词：去国有化变革新制度经济学产权理论 国有银行非国有银行 外部性 软预算约束 

分 类 号：F831[经济管理—金融学]