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机构地区:[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026
出 处:《系统工程》2007年第4期9-14,共6页Systems Engineering
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70525001)
摘 要:目前众多的延期支付模型大多考虑到在销售商在给定延期支付的条件下如何确定最优的定购数量或者定购周期,而很少考虑生产商的延期支付策略的制定。同时,多数讨论集中在单个生产商和单个销售商之间的协调关系,忽略了多个销售商之间的相互竞争。本文首次利用斯坦博格博弈模型给出了在单个生产商和多个销售商的情况下,生产商延期支付策略选择和销售商的最优订货决策,并举例说明。Many of existing EOQ models under a given delay-in-payments tactic consider to decide the optimal order quantity and cycle. Moreover, those studies often emphasized on relationship and coordination between manufacture and retailer, which neglected the competition among retailers. This paper proposes Stackelberg game model to get the optimal delay-in- payments tactic as well as optimal ordering police subject to single vendor and multiple buyers supply chain. Simultaneously, competition within retailers is modeled as the Nash game. Finally numerical examples are shown to illustrate the results given in the paper.
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