审计合谋的一个博弈均衡分析框架  

Game equilibrium analysis framework for auditing collusion

作　　者：余玉苗[1] 田娟[1] 朱业明[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院会计系,武汉430072

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2007年第4期32-37,共6页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572063)

摘　　要：当前审计环境中,审计合谋现象普遍存在,双重审计制度可以看作是阻止审计合谋的一种制度设计.在分析审计合谋成因的基础上,建立了一个包括引入第二个审计师的概率因子、融合外部监督惩罚与激励机制的博弈模型,对阻止审计合谋的条件进行了均衡分析.研究结果显示,当外部监督惩罚力度强化后与适当的激励机制存在时,双重审计制度有利于降低对审计师的监督成本,从而为其实施提供了理论依据;从多期博弈角度看,这一制度还有利于削弱审计师的"合谋偏好",最终使双重审计回归到单一审计路线上来,节约对审计师的社会监督成本.Auditing collusion phenomena are very common in present auditing environment, and the double auditing system can be seen as a policy to deterring the phenomena. After we analyze the causes of it, a game model, including the probability factor of introducing the second auditor, exterior supervision, punishment and reward mechanism, is constructed to analyze the equilibrium conditions for deterring auditors from the auditing collusion. The conclusion is that, if we enforce outside supervision over auditors and design suitable reward mechanisms, the system is very beneficial to lower the cost of supervising auditors, which provides theoretical base for us to practice the policy; what＇ s more, this policy is also beneficial to weaken auditors＇ collusion preference from the long-term game perspective, and to regress the double auditing system into the single auditing system so that we can save the whole social supervision cost.

关 键 词：审计合谋 博弈 均衡分析 

分 类 号：F239.43[经济管理—会计学]