公共政策执行阻滞的博弈分析——以环境污染治理为例  

The Game Analysis of Policy Failure——With the Example of the Environment Protection

作　　者：周国雄[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《同济大学学报（社会科学版）》2007年第4期91-96,共6页Journal of Tongji University:Social Science Edition

摘　　要：公共政策执行难是当前各级政府面临的普遍问题。由于地方政府逐利行为所导致的中央与地方政府间利益博弈是形成政策执行难问题的主要根源。本文以环境污染治理为例,尝试从博弈论的视角出发,对政策执行阻滞的发生机理作一分析,并就提高公共政策执行力提出制度创新建议。The difficulty of the policies implementation is one of the general problems which the governments have to confront. The games between the central government and the local ones caused by the local governments＇ interests are the main reason for the difficulty of the policies implementation. The paper tries to analyze the principle of policies failure and present some advice of the system innovation for upgrading the efficacy of the policy implementation with the example of the protection of the environment.

关 键 词：公共政策 政府 利益 博弈 制度创新 

分 类 号：C931.2[经济管理—管理学]