专有信息与授权  

Specific Information and Delegation

作　　者：郭新帅[1] 缪柏其[1] 方世建[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《预测》2007年第5期18-23,30,共7页Forecasting

摘　　要：本文研究专有信息对授权决策的影响。代理人拥有专有信息,委托人要想利用其专有信息以增进自己的利益,就必须将活动授权给代理人,并为其提供适当的激励合约。通过明确地考虑委托人面临的外部机会及其相对于代理人的能力高低,本文表明,在一定条件下,为了利用代理人的专有信息,委托人会选择授权;并且分析了环境风险、委托人的外部机会及其相关能力等因素对授权所要求的信息质量的阈值的影响。This paper investigates the effect of specific information on delegation. The agent has specific information. To utilize it, the principal has no way but delegate the relevant activity to the agent and offer him appropriate incentives contract. By explicitly considering the outside opportunity facing the principal and his ability relative to the agent ,we show that, under certain conditions, the principal will delegate the activity to the agent to exploit his specific information. We also analyze the effects of environmental risk, the outside opportunity facing and relevant ability of the principal on the threshold of the quality of the specific information for delegation to occur.

关 键 词：授权 专有信息 激励 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学]