我国上市公司盈余管理实证研究  

Empirical Research on Earnings Management Behaviors of China's Listed Companies

作　　者：谢润邦[1] 朱灿[2] 戴盛[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南商学院工商管理系,湖南长沙410205 [2]湖南大学金融学院,湖南长沙410082

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2007年第5期88-91,共4页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：盈余管理是困扰上市公司信息质量的一个主要问题。过度的盈余管理,必然造成会计信息失真,影响资本市场的资源配置。从上市公司盈余管理的配股动机出发,采用Fama-French三因素模型分析配股政策对上市公司盈余管理行为的影响,结果表明:配股政策对上市公司盈余管理行为有显著影响,我国上市公司的盈余管理行为是政策诱导型的。因此,加强证券市场监管是治理盈余管理问题的根本出路。Earnings management is a primary problem disturbing the information quality of listed companies. Excessive earnings management causes false accountant information and affects capital allocation in capital market. Beginning with the motion of seasoned equity offerings, this article uses Fama French three factors model analyzing the influence of rights issue police on earning management. The results show that rights issue polices induce the behaviors of earning management of China＇ s listed companies. It is important for China to quicken up the process of marketization of control in the stock market.

关 键 词：配股政策 盈余管理 再融资 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]