政府权力的腐败及治理——基于委托—代理机制的分析  

Corruption and Governance of Administrative Power in China——Analysis based on the request-proxy Mechanism

作　　者：黄钦[1] 夏芳[1] 

机构地区：[1]燕山大学文法学院,河北秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《信阳师范学院学报（哲学社会科学版）》2007年第5期28-31,共4页Journal of Xinyang Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

摘　　要：政府权力腐败既是一个历史现象又是一个国际现象,发展中国家更是普遍受到腐败现象的严重困扰。在经济人假设基础上的委托—代理机制分析方法对政府权力腐败现象有很强的解释力。在委托—代理机制中,政府官员贪污和寻租是最典型的腐败方式。有效治理政府权力腐败,必须加强惩罚机制、完善激励机制、健全法制监督机制和优化行政权力结构配置。The corruption of administrative power is a not only a historical but also an international phenomenon, developing countries are extremely disturbed by it. The method of request-proxy mechanism analysis, which is based on the assumption of economic man, can properly explain the corruption phenomenon of our administrative power. In the request-proxy mechanism, the government officials corrupting and rent-seeklng is the most typical of corruption. In order to prevent the corruption of our administrative power effectively, we need to strengthen the mechanism of punishment, improve the mechanism of incentive, and perfect the mechanism of supervision and optimize the allocation of administrative power structure.

关 键 词：政府权力 腐败 委托—代理机制 

分 类 号：D035[政治法律—政治学]