基于产品差异化的航空联盟定价  

Airline Alliance Pricing in Connecting Market Based on Differentiated Products

作　　者：廖刚[1] 陈宏民[1] 潘小军[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2007年第4期376-381,共6页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70172001)

摘　　要：考虑产品差异化的航空联盟跨市场定价问题,内生地考虑了联盟航空公司和非联盟航空公司选择价格领导者还是价格跟随者的价格博弈均衡问题。研究表明,与单市场相比,跨市场的航空公司更愿意争取后动优势,做价格制定的追随者而不是领导者;联程票的价格低于单市场的直接航班票价之和;联盟使得航空公司的利润增加,大多数情况下使得非联盟航空公司利润减少。从社会的角度而言,产品差异化大的航空市场,航空联盟的出现会增加总消费者剩余,提高整个社会的福利,政府应该持支持态度。This paper studies the airline alliance competition in the connecting market with differelatated products, discusses the airline alliance and unallied airlines how to endogenously choose the role of falreleader or fare follower and which type of equilibrium exists. The study shows all the airlines prefer the fare-follower to fare-leader contrast to the single market,The price of the connecting ticket is lower than the sum of the direct ticket Airline alliance gets more profit and hurts the unallied airlines. The findings suggest that the government should support the airline alliance behavior in the market with largely differentiated products, because the airline alliance can enhance the consumer surplus and improve the social welfare.

关 键 词：航空联盟 产品差异化 价格领导者 价格追随者 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]