环境污染问题的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Environmental Pollution Problem

作　　者：卢方元[1] 

机构地区：[1]郑州大学商学院,郑州450001

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2007年第9期148-152,共5页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

摘　　要：用演化博弈论的方法对产污企业之间、环保部门和产污企业之间相互作用时的策略选择行为进行分析.结果表明:当产污企业不处理污染物的收益大于处理污染物的收益、环保部门对不处理污染物的企业处罚力度过轻或对产污企业进行监测的成本过高时,环境污染必然发生.要确保环境不被严重污染,就必须对不处理污染物的企业进行严惩,降低不处理污染物的预期收益.同时,要加强环保队伍建设,严格执法,加大对环保的投入,减少监测成本.Analyzing the strategies＇ choice on the interaction among the producing pollution＇s enterprises, between the environmental protection department and the producing pollution＇s enterprises with the evolutionary game theory. The result shows that when the payoff for dealing with the waste residue of the producing pollution＇s enterprises is larger than not, or the punishment on the enterprises who don＇t deal with the pollutant is too light, or the monitoring cost of the environmental protection department is too large, then environment pollution is inevitable. Punishing the enterprises who don＇t deal with the pollutant and reducing their expected payoff to make sure the environment won＇t be severely polluted. At the same time, we should strengthen the environmental protection personnel, strictly enforce the law, increase it input, and reduce the monitoring cost.

关 键 词：环境污染 复制动态 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F22[经济管理—国民经济]