政府管制俘虏理论对我国非法小煤矿监管的启示  

The Application of Capture Theory of Government Regulation to Supervision of Illegal Small Coal Mine

作　　者：李新光[1] 

机构地区：[1]武夷学院,福建武夷山354300

出　　处：《哈尔滨商业大学学报（社会科学版）》2007年第5期117-121,共5页Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition

摘　　要：运用"政府管制俘虏理论"来解释当前非法小煤矿大量存在的问题,被管制者矿主通过不同的手段对政府管制者进行寻租俘虏,诱使管制者目标出现多元化,制定对他们有利的措施并利用这些措施为自身谋取私利,这是俘虏行为发生的原因。This article applies ＂capture theory of government regulation＂to analyze the existence of illegal small coal mines in China currently.At first,the article reviews the capture theory of government regulation,and then discusses how the coal owners capture the government officers by different means to diversify the target of government,and mainly discusses the cause of these captive behavior.At last,the article puts forward some measures to the problem.

关 键 词：非法小煤矿 政府管制 俘虏理论 寻租 

分 类 号：F091.349[经济管理—政治经济学]