美国金融监管预先承诺方法的经验与启示  

The Experience and Enlightenment of the Pre-Commitment Approach in the US Financial Regulation

作　　者：陈阳[1] 熊鹏[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院金融与保险学系,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《国际经贸探索》2007年第9期39-43,共5页International Economics and Trade Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金课题(06CJL012);教育部人文社会科学一般项目(05JC790100)

摘　　要：在中国银行业开放进程逐渐加快而相关金融政策改革不断深入的背景下,我国需要从制度上建立一种激励相容机制,使得金融行业能够从其自身微观主体的角度完善和提高抗风险能力。借鉴美国金融监管预先承诺方法的成功经验,积极培育金融机构内部风险评估能力,大力推进激励机制在我国银行业风险监管中的使用,并继续加强人民银行在银行业风险监管中的作用,才能最终实现我国金融监管的制度优化。With the increasing opening-up of China＇s banking industry and the deepening reform of financial policies, the financial supervision of China, which has lots of insufficiencies, needs to establish an incentive-compatible approach to enhance the anti-risk ability of the financial institutions. Thus, by studying theoretically and empirically on the Pre-Commitment Approach in the US with its incentives and regulation effect, we concludes that in order to optimize China＇s financial regulation, it is suggested to learn from the incentive-compatible Pre-Commitment Approach, to actively foster the financial institution＇s risk evaluation ability, to vigorously promote the application of the incentive-compatible approach, and to continuously reinforce the role of the People＇s Bank of China in financial regulation.

关 键 词：预先承诺方法 金融监管 激励规制 监管体系 

分 类 号：F830.45[经济管理—金融学]