农产品不公平贸易政府行为的市场动力及耦合机制研究  

Research on the Market Impetus and Coupling Mechanism of Government Behavior in the Unfair Trade of Farm Produce

作　　者：马述忠[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学经济学院

出　　处：《国际贸易问题》2007年第10期18-22,共5页Journal of International Trade

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70673086);国家社会科学基金项目(07CJY041);教育部社科规划项目(06JA790104);浙江省哲学社会科学规划重点项目(Z05YJ02)的系列研究成果之一。

摘　　要：由于一些国家经常采取各种手段,实施不公平竞争,导致了农产品贸易摩擦的频繁发生:一方面,任何农业贸易政策都是政治市场均衡的结果。发达国家的政府为获得农业利益集团的政治支持,倾向于采取贸易保护政策。另一方面,农业目标必须与其他行业目标保持平衡,同时,农业贸易政策目标也是多元化的,存在各目标彼此协调的问题。在不确定性环境中,农业政策的形成具有连续性和惯性。For no other reasons than that some countries often take all kinds of measures to implement unfair competition, the trade friction on farm produce occurs frequently. On the one hand, any trade policy on agriculture is the result of the balance made by disputing governments. The voting systems in developed countries give their farmers comparatively more political rights and higher status. To obtain the political support of agricultural interest groups, politicians tend to adopt trade protectionism. On the other hand, agriculture is not one and only policy field; agriculture objectives must keep their balance with other industry objectives; the policy objectives of agricultural trade are various and there exist abstract objectives which can contain and coordinate each other. In the uncertain circumstance, the formulation of agricultural policy takes on continuity and inertia.

关 键 词：农产品 不公平贸易 政治市场 政府行为 利益集团 

分 类 号：F323.7[经济管理—产业经济]