投资者、管理者和审计者间的关系解析：审计独立性视角  

The Relationship Among Investors:Managers and Auditors

作　　者：许新霞[1] 王学军[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《经济管理》2007年第10期16-19,共4页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

摘　　要：本文通过投资者、管理者、审计者在3种不同情形下的收益函数的分析和比较,认为在外部监督机制和内部治理结构不能保障审计权独立性的条件下,委托权、管理权和审计权将从三权的制衡转向审计权和管理权的双方博弈,偷懒和串谋成为审计者和管理者最优均衡策略。As a production process of managers＇ information, auditor is vital to mitigate the risk of information asymmetry. The purpose of this paper is to explore the reason and result of transformation from the auditor independence to dependence, by presenting and analyzing the agents game model in three circumstances. The results reported suggests that if the overall efficiency of the outside monitoring mechanism and inside governance are not high enough to improve the auditor independence, fraud and collusion will be the optimal choice of the auditor and manager.

关 键 词：审计权 管理权 委托权 独立性 

分 类 号：F239.0[经济管理—会计学]