我国对上市公司会计欺诈行为的监管研究——引入第三方博弈的“囚犯困境”模型及应用  

Supervision on the Accounting Fraud of Listed Company in China-the Model and Application of Prisoners Dilemma with the Third Party

作　　者：周健[1] 

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学经济学院,辽宁沈阳110036

出　　处：《当代经济管理》2007年第5期115-118,共4页Contemporary Economic Management

摘　　要：近几年来,国内外上市公司会计欺诈案件呈现上升趋势,而且影响巨大。本文从一个新的分析视角——引入第三方博弈的"囚徒困境"模型出发,剖析了上市公司会计欺诈行为产生的原因就在于外在监督制度——法律体系和市场监管体系力量的削弱和缺失。因此,要实现对上市公司会计欺诈行为的有效监管就需要不断完善相应的外在监督制度,而切入点就在于对被监管者的勾结得益、勾结成本和勾结风险的有效控制。In recent years, the international accounting fraud of listed company is increasing with enormous influence. From a new angle-Prisoners Dilemma model with the third party to participate in game, this paper investigates that accounting fraud of listed company lies in weakening and the lack of the external supervisory system. Therefore, the improvement of the corresponding external supervisory system can help to realize the effective supervision on the accounting fraud of listed company, and the key is to control the benefit of colluding, cost of colluding and risk of colluding of the supervised company.

关 键 词：囚犯困境 会计欺诈 监管 

分 类 号：F23[经济管理—会计学] F832.5[经济管理—国民经济]