易逝品供应链回购激励机理研究  

Study on Incentive Mechanism of Buy Back Contract in Supply Chain of Perishable Product

作　　者：张建军[1] 霍佳震[1] 赵晋[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2007年第5期83-88,共6页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：上海市科委重点科技攻关项目(03JC14068)

摘　　要：运用委托代理理论对易逝品供应链中完全信息条件下基于批发价格c与回购价格b的激励机理进行了研究,并基于不完全契约理论给出了可行回购契约的具体形式,得出结论:(1)该回购激励价格组合能够在最大化供应链总期望收益的基础上达到对该收益的任意分配比例;(2)该回购机制事实上是一个具有不唯一子博弈均衡解的"讨价还价博弈模型",均衡解取决于双方的贴现因子;(3)该回购机制是共享供应链收益的一个可行的实施方式。分析并证明了不对称信息下该回购机制不能使供应链收益达到Pareto最优,这从一个侧面说明了信息共享障碍在供应链中的危害性以及消除的必要性和困难性。On the basis of Principal-Agent Theory, firstly the connotation and extension of the incentive mechanism with trade price c and buy back price b as variables in a supply chain of full-information-sharing perishable product was studied, and the specific form of feasible buyback contract was presented ： 1） The buy back price combination （c, b） can reach the Pareto-optimized system profit and distribute the profit in an arbitrary proportion 2） The buy-back mechanism is actually an alternating-offers model with non-unique sub-game equilibrium solution, and the solution is determined by their discount factors; 3） The buy-back mechanism is feasible in sharing the profit of supply chain. Secondly, it was proved that the buy-back mechanism can not lead to the Pareto-optimized system profit with information asymmetry, which shows the harm of the obstacles in information-sharing and also the necessity and difficulty to eliminate it.

关 键 词：易逝品供应链 回购合同 激励 委托代理 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]