跨国污染转移经济效应分析  

A Game Model Analysis of Economic Effects of Transnational Transfer of Pollution

作　　者：于谨凯[1] 邱云秀[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国海洋大学经济学院,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《国际经贸探索》2007年第10期8-11,22,共5页International Economics and Trade Research

摘　　要：跨国污染转移给发展中国家和发达国家都带来正的社会经济效应和负的社会经济效应。单一国家的局部均衡模型和国际一般博弈模型显示,只有各国对污染的自愿治理量达到一定程度,才能实现社会经济效应的最大化。文章对跨国污染转移给我国带来的就业增长和出口增长的正效应,以及使我国环境污染严重、污染治理成本增加和使我国出口遭到更多的"绿色壁垒"的负效应进行了实证分析。从长期来看,如果我国对跨国污染转移不加以控制,其负效应将要大于正效应,不利于我国经济的可持续发展。Transnational transfer of pollution has brought positive and negative social welfare effects for both developing countries and developed countries. The paper builds a partial equilibrium model based on individual countries and a game model based on the whole world. It concludes that only if the amount of voluntary pollution disposal of every country reaches a certain level can the maximization of social welfare be achieved. It makes an empirical analysis about the social welfare effects. In the long run, if our country cannot control the negative effects, they will be greater than the positive effects, which will make against .the sustainable development of China.

关 键 词：跨国污染转移 博弈模型分析 经济效应 

分 类 号：F741.1[经济管理—国际贸易]