基于地下经济行为的博弈分析  

Analyze the Underground Economy Through the Dynamic Game Theory

作　　者：蒋玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学经济与金融学院,安徽蚌埠233041

出　　处：《技术经济》2007年第11期107-109,120,共4页Journal of Technology Economics

基　　金：中华全国供销合作总社基金(GXZSKY06026)

摘　　要：第二次世界大战以后,经济学家在对传统经济进行反思的过程中,开始从地下经济角度来解释现实经济现象中宏观经济预测的偏离及菲力普斯曲线开始向上和向外盘旋现象。地下经济一般被认为是由那些企业或个人防止和逃避政府的管制、税收和监察的经济活动和由此获得的收入构成的。根据政府作为政策制定者和观察者及受调查者即企业或个人之间的关系,本文提供了一个相互作用系统的样板,通过政府和企业及个人之间在交税行为过程中产生的信号传递反馈系统,拟用一种不完全信息的动态博弈分析方法,论证得出信息系统的完整化、公开化、政府法律政策严明性及政府的相机抉择制度对社会经济发展的重要作用。Since the World War Ⅱ , during the process of self-questioning of traditional economics, economists have been explaining the departure of prediction of macrophysics and the phenomenon of hovering of Philips Curve based on the Underground Economy. Generally, the Underground Economy consists of all commerce on which applicable taxes are being evaded. According to the relationships between government （policy designer and observer） and enterprises or individuals who are investigated, and the signal transmission feeding back system produced by the paying tax process of the government and enterprise or individuals. The thesis provides an interactive template to us, intending to analyze it through the Dynamic Game Theory with non-complete information, aiming at demonstrating the integrity and opening of information systems, the preciseness of the law and the social development brought by government＇s decision.

关 键 词：地下经济行为 不完全信息博弈 分离均衡 混同均衡 

分 类 号：F121.29[经济管理—世界经济] F224