新规制经济学的俘获理论与中国政府规制体制改革  

The Capture Theory of the New Regulation Economics and the Reform of Regulation System in China's Governments

作　　者：杜传忠[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济与社会发展研究院,天津300071

出　　处：《南通大学学报（社会科学版）》2007年第5期45-49,共5页Journal of Nantong University:Social Sciences Edition

摘　　要：新规制经济学的规制俘获理论将信息不对称作为理论前提,运用委托代理理论的分析框架,分析了政府规制俘获发生的机理,在此基础上得出许多预防和克服规制俘获发生的对策。处于经济转轨时期的中国垄断性产业和国有企业与作为规制者和管理者的政府部门之间有着紧密的联系,发生政府规制俘获的空间和可能性更大。在这种条件下,借鉴新规制经济学的规制俘获理论,对于制定有效的防范规制俘获发生的机制和政策具有重要意义。The capture theory of the new regulation economics is based upon the theory of asymmetric information. Applying the analyzing framework of principal-agent theory, the theory deals with the generation mechanism of the regulation capture of governments, and on this foundation obtains lots of proposals to prevent the occurrence of regulation capture. During the period of economic transformation, China＇s monopoly industries and the state-owned enterprises are closely connected with departments of governments who work as regulators and administrators, so there are more chances for the occurrences of regulation captures in governments. Therefore, it is of significance to establish effective precautions and policies against regulation capture with reference to the capture theory of regulation.

关 键 词：规制俘获理论 信息不对称 政府规制体制改革 

分 类 号：D630.1[政治法律—政治学]