省际边界河流水资源费征收的博弈分析  

Game analysis of imposing water resources fee of inter-provincial river

作　　者：胡明[1] 杨永德 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学水利水电学院,湖北武汉430072 [2]长江水利委员会水政水资源局,湖北武汉430010

出　　处：《武汉大学学报（工学版）》2007年第5期11-14,共4页Engineering Journal of Wuhan University

摘　　要：针对目前省际边界河流水资源费征收工作中,征收主体与征收标准不明确,导致边界两省分别按照各自标准同时征收的局面,构建了边界两省在不向中央上缴水资源费、向中央上缴以及中央对上缴实行返还3种情况下的博弈模型,分析了不向中央上缴时两省争收的必然性,探讨了实行上缴和上缴并返还2种政策时,改变争收局面的可能性以及上缴与返还比例应满足的条件,并进行了实例推算.通过分析推算得出以下结论:实行上缴并返还的政策,并选取适当的上缴与返还比例,不仅可以平衡两省的利益,改变争收局面,也能使中央与地方实现合理的利益分配.Both of the two provinces impose the water resources fee when they are involved in water use of an inter-provincial river. This is because who should levy the fee and how much should be levied are not clear in the related policy and regulations. Trying to solve this problem, three game models are proposed. One is that the resources fee is all kept by the local government; another one is that part of the resources fee should be handed in to the central government and the third one is that after the central government receives the fee, part of it should be returned to the local government who don＇t impose the resources fee. Moreover, the inevitability of disputing the benefit is analyzed if both provinces do not hand in the water resources fee. The possibility of settling disputes with the last two policies are also analyzed and calculated. The following conclusion can be drawn after analysis and calculation. It is feasible to settle the dispute if appropriate turning in and returning proportions are implemented.

关 键 词：博弈论 水资源费 省际边界河流 

分 类 号：TV213.4[水利工程—水文学及水资源]