基于动态博弈的闭环供应链回收质量控制研究  

Study On the Quality Control Policy in the Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on the Dynamic Game Theory

作　　者：熊中楷[1] 曹俊[1] 刘克俊 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]苏州同和资源综合利用有限公司,苏州215129

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2007年第4期42-50,共9页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(02cjy027);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70571088);重庆市自然科学基金资助项目(cstc.2006BB0188)

摘　　要：本文采用三阶段的动态博弈模型,研究了在单个制造商和单个销售商构成的分散式闭环供应链中,占主导地位的制造商如何制定质量处罚比例和质量抽检比例,从而对销售商回收的废旧产品数量和质量实施引导和控制。本文建立了相应的模型并给出了最优解,并通过算例讨论了不同的废旧产品缺陷率和监督成本对双方决策的影响。This papers mainly study the quality control policy in the single period decentralized closed-loop supply chain composed by a manufacturer and a retailer. Based on the three stage, dynamic game theory, we consider the retailer, which as a leader in the game, how decides the penalty rate of defectively used products and the inspection rate on incoming items from retailer, and the retailer how decides the return rate of used products and the inspection rate on incoming items from consumer. In addition, we build the model to solve this problem and discuss the cost of supervising and the impact of different defective rate of used products on the decision-makings of both the manufacturer and the retailer by mathematics example.

关 键 词：动态博弈 闭环供应链 质量控制 

分 类 号：F253.4[经济管理—国民经济]