监管不完备性、国家信誉淡出与自律管理——一个不成熟市场视野中的中国银行业自律管理制度变迁  

Incompleteness of Supervision,Desalination of Governmental Creditability and Self-discipline Administration——Evolution of the People's Bank of China's System of Self-discipline Administration in Terms of an Immature Market

作　　者：李华民[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东金融学院华南金融研究所

出　　处：《陕西师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2007年第6期79-87,共9页Journal of Shaanxi Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：广东省自然科学基金项目(7005645)

摘　　要：法律与监管的不完备性决定了行业自律管理的存在空间,与WTO制度接轨的"时间约束效应"以及国家信誉淡出政府银行的必然性,主导了中国银行业自律管理制度的发源与诞生。私人部门合作能力不强和市场惩罚主动性不足决定了中国银行业自律管理制度完全通过市场自然演进生成的不可预期性,也决定了制度变迁的政府主导特征。在现阶段,中国银行业自律管理的制度效率至少部分地来源于对特殊体制资源的动员和利用,来自于政府监管部门的"外生"驱动。伴随着中国金融改革与开放的纵深推进,政府驱动型行业自律管理制度,必然向以市场惩罚为核心运作机制的内生性自律管理制度演变。政府的政策应该主动催化这种替代进程。The incompleteness of law and supervision determines the space of existence for self - discipline in Chinese banking, ＂the temporal binding effect＂ to become incorporated with the system of WTO and the necessity of desalination of state creditability out of the government bank and leads to the birth of system of self -discipline administration in Chinese banking. The unpredictability generated spontaneously in natural evolution totally through market and the governmental leading part characteristic of the existing self - discipline system have both re.suited from the poor cooperation of private sect and shortage of market initiative in punishment. At present, the efficiency of the banking self- discipline system comes at least partly from the mobilization and utilization of resources of the special institutions and the ＂intruding＂ drive of governmental supervising departments. With the deeper advancement of reform and opening in Chinese banking, the present government- driven self - discipline system must evolve to a market - punishment - based spontaneous self - discipline system of banking administration.

关 键 词：政府监管 国家信誉 自律管理制度 声誉效应机制 市场惩罚机制 

分 类 号：F830.1[经济管理—金融学]