DES差分功耗分析攻击设计与实现  

Design and Realization of Differential Power Analysis for DES

作　　者：褚杰[1] 丁国良[1] 邓高明[1] 赵强[1] 

机构地区：[1]军械工程学院计算机工程系,河北石家庄050003

出　　处：《小型微型计算机系统》2007年第11期2070-2073,共4页Journal of Chinese Computer Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(60571037)资助.

摘　　要：针对DES(Data Encryption Standard)加密电路,采用了差分功耗分析(Differential Power Analysis,DPA)攻击方式进行解密.该方法是一种典型的功耗类型旁路攻击方式(Side Channel Attacks,SCA),其理论基础为集成电路(ICs)中基本单元CMOS逻辑门在实现加密算法时的物理特征、功耗模型及数据功耗相关特性.结合具体电路,介绍了针对DES加密系统进行的差分功耗分析攻击的设计与实现.目前,实验已经成功地破解了DES加密算法中56位有效密钥中的48位,逐步逼进了最终破解目标.这一结果至少已经表明,由于集成电路功耗等物理信号的泄漏及其在处理不同数据时功耗的差别,未加防护措施的DES加密系统终将难以抵御差分功耗分析的攻击.The paper introduces Differential Power Analysis （DPA） attack of the decrypt encrypted circuits with DES is one particularly powerful type of Side Channel Attacks （SCA）. All its theories are based upon the physical characters, power consumption models and data-dependent power consumption of CMOS logic gates which form the integrated circuits （ICs）. The paper introduces the design and realization of DPA attacks for encrypted systems with DES against a concrete circuit. In experiments, 48-bit key in the 56-bit effective key of DES encryption algorithm is detected successfully. It comes gradually and closely into ultimate target of the attack. The result indicates that DES encrypted systems without some extra protective measures can＇t resist the attacks of DPA, because of the leakages from the physical signals and the difference of power consumption while processing the different data of ICs.

关 键 词：加密 DES 旁路攻击 差分功耗分析 汉明距离 功耗模型 

分 类 号：TP309.7[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]