“私了”现象的博弈逻辑分析  

A Game Logic Analysis to the Phenomenon of "Private Settlement of Legal Problems"

作　　者：贺寿南[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学哲学系,江苏南京210008

出　　处：《湖南科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2007年第6期40-43,共4页Journal of Hunan University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

摘　　要：人们规避国家制定法而偏好"私了"并不一定是一种不懂法的表现,而是对"私了"进行博弈逻辑分析后所作出的一种理性选择。从博弈论的观点分析了"私了"存在的经济根源,并从逻辑学的角度详细探究了"私了"现象所产生的社会根源和其它原因,提出应在法律的许可限度内,允许公民在一定规则和司法的合理引导下,通过"私了"的理性协商、沟通和对话解决问题,使公民合理地享有私权自治处理纠纷的权利与可能。It is not necessarily unknown to law that people evade law and like ＂Private Settlement of Legal Problerns＂. It is a rational selection after people have analyzed it. This paper analyzes the economic reasons that such a phenomenon has long existed are investigated from the game perspective. Besides, the social roots for it are clarified from logic. It is proposed that civilians should be allowed, as long as law permits, to settle legal problems privately on the basis of negotiation, communication and dialogue under proper institutional and judicial guidance. In this case, every Chinese citizen can enjoy the right of claiming and disposing personal disputes freely on a reasonable basis.

关 键 词：规避 私了 博弈逻辑 理性协商 

分 类 号：B812[哲学宗教—逻辑学]