司法者激励对司法公正影响的模型分析  

Study on Influences of Judiciary Incentives on Judicial Fairness Based on Game Theory

作　　者：王雷[1] 万迪昉[1] 贾明[1] 张喆[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2007年第6期79-87,共9页Modern Economic Science

摘　　要：司法公正与法官激励是当前司法领域中所面临的最为紧迫而关键的问题。本研究运用博弈论来模拟现实的审判过程。通过分析基于个人效用最大化的法官最优选择的基础上来研究法官的法律遵从度、工作勤勉程度、工资收入、外部干预(如贿赂)、司法权的有效配置等重要因素对法官裁判的影响,进而解决社会所获得的公正执法水平。对于不同法律遵从度的法官而言,贿赂、工资等因素的影响是不同的。提高法官法律遵从度并调整法官与社会之间的效用关系,从制度上实现司法权的有效配置,对于实现司法公正至关重要。这为解决当前司法领域所存在的问题提供了理论依据和方法。Judicial fairness and judiciary incentives are the most urgent and critical problems in judge area.This study uses game theory to simulate real trial process.For optimal judiciary choice based on maximum personal utility,we study the relationships between the following factors: judicial fairness and compliance degree with law,work diligence,income,effective allocation of judging rights,and external intervention.Judges for the different legal compliance,bribery,wages and other factors are different.The allocation of judging rights affect the social utility.Independent exclusive judging rights as the incentive mechanism and introduce incentive mechanisms in institutional arrangements are very important for establishment control rights incentives to accomplish social fairness.This solution to the current problems in the judicial field has provided a theoretical basis and methodology.

关 键 词：司法者激励 司法公正 博弈分析 

分 类 号：D916[政治法律—法学]